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Abstract
It is argued that the traditional “realist” methodology of physics,
according to which human concepts, laws and theories can grasp
the essence of reality, is incompatible with the most fruitful in-
terpretation of quantum formalism. The proof rests on the vi-
olation by quantum mechanics of the foundational principles of
that methodology. An alternative methodology, in which the con-
struction of sciences finishes at the level of human experience, as
standard quantum theory strongly suggests, is then conjectured.
1 Introduction
In a recent book, Lee Smolin defends a conception of science that he calls “real-
ist”, according to which science should inform us how the real world out there,
or nature, really is in our absence (Smolin, 2007). The previous sentence does
not reflect only a personal point of view. In spite of the radical change that with
respect to physical reality quantum theory has produced, this conception is still
dominant inside the scientific community and permeates classical physics as well
as all the other sciences. This belief is based on different arguments and ideas
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that Smolin explicitly or implicitly reproduces. The first idea is the introduction
of a set of principles, which can be derived from “pure reason”, as necessary
preconditions to reach that objective. Einstein was the champion between the
defenders of this approach. The second idea is that given that the world out
there exists independently of our existence, as one of those principles affirms,
the individual persons, or the subject, are interchangeable and eventually can
be segregated. The third idea is that this world can be known with certainty
and, as result of our free inquires, we should get a perfect representation of how
nature is. The fourth idea is that nature is unified, there is only one world.
Therefore, we should be able to find a final and complete theory, a theory of
everything, including all we know.
This program, well known by both scientists and philosophers of science,
has given to science the greatest success. The advance of knowledge based on it
in physics, biology, chemistry, etc., was unprecedented in human history. Even
today, with minimal but necessary adjustments, the belief in a real world out
there and the possibility of knowing it with certainty in its minute details is, for
many scientists, the motivation to carry out the difficult but enthralling work
of making science.
However, in the first twenty five years of the XX century, the experimental
facts shown that in the microscopic realm the previous approach was too limited
and, to a certain extent, unjustified. This surprising development was not the
consequence of a philosophical whim. It was slowly but indefatigably imposed
on the scientific community by the progressive accumulation of facts, that were
impossible to accommodate inside the previous program. Experiments like those
by Rubens and Kurlbaum (1900) on the black body spectrum; Lennard’s pho-
toelectric effect (1904); Rutherford, Geiger and Marsden (1909), on the nuclear
atom; Bohr’s model (1913) and the Frank and Hertz (1914) verification of the
discrete atomic energy levels; Stern and Gerlach experiment on the existence
of the spin (1922); Compton experiments (1923); Davisson and Germer (1926)
on the interference of electrons; etc., all this experimental evidence opened a
necessary and new manner of looking at nature, which questioned the same ba-
sis of the above realist approach. It was then conjectured that in physics there
were two different domains of experience, the micro and the macroscopic; that
the a priori principles did not work in the microscopic domain; that the subject
could not be altogether eliminated and that, if there is a world out there, we
could not reach and know its essences. The message seemed to be that, at the
microscopic level, physics did not speak anymore about how the world really
is in our absence, but how the world is in a concrete historical period of the
human development. That is, how the world is in our presence.
This essay does not endorse or develop any previous philosophical work.
Rather, it seeks to establish a new approach to the old debate between these
two alternatives and, for this reason, it neither does refer to recent philosophi-
cal literature, nor engages in current discussions on the philosophy of quantum
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physics.
The paper is organized with the following structure. First, we briefly outline
the traditional approach to physics by stating explicitly the a priori principles
considered necessary preconditions for physical thinking. Part 3 is dedicated
to analyze the pros and cons of this traditional methodology. In part four, we
show how the standard interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanical
formalism functions in practice. We illustrate its functioning by using an ex-
ample taken from quantum information theory, namely entanglement swapping.
By analyzing swapping, we will prove in part five that quantum formalism does
violate the principles previously introduced. Part 6 is a brief remainder of how
in the past, the principles which were firmly established manifested a strong re-
sistance to be eliminated. Part 7 introduces an “operative” methodology based
not on abstract philosophical analysis, but on the practical use of the theory
shown in the previous discussion. This methodology includes an idea of truth
without correspondence.
2 Einstein’s Critical Realism As The “Traditional”
Methodology Of Physics
It could reasonably be maintained that in the scientific practice and as far as the
last objectives of the scientific inquiry were concerned, and until approximately
86 years ago, there were only “one methodology of science”1. This traditional
methodology, that even today constitutes the epistemological backbone of many
research programs, could be schematically characterized in the following way.
It begins by postulating that there is out there a material world, which justifies
why we all see the same things (Gardner, 1983). Then, it adds that men are a
very accidental and later descendent of primates. For this very reason, reality
is there before us and it cannot depend on our existence. And it concludes
by stating that the objective of physics, sciences in general, must be to inform
us about how this material world really is in our absence, as if we were not
here. Concretely, physics has to provide us explanations of why things happen;
that is, an understanding and even a spatiotemporal image, a representation, of
what is going on in its minute details. More arrogant and ambitious programs
add that nature is only one, and, therefore, we should be able to find only one
final theory from which everything could be deduced, perhaps men included
(Weinberg, 1993). That means that if we were clever enough, and we had suffi-
cient computational power, we could calculate how “things” would behave as a
consequence of the properties of its last constituents, today quarks and leptons
1This is a coarse mode of presenting the problem. The stated methodology is a general syn-
thesis of different methodologies of science that have been profusely discussed by philosophers
in the last two centuries. We are conscious of this defect, but in this schematic characteriza-
tion, we adopt the point of view of the majority of the experimental physicists’ community.
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(reductionism)2. Last, by not least, it is supposed that the subjects are free to
choose the experiments they want to carry out.
This approach to physics contains a set of principles that being a priori, or
deducible from pure reason, to use Kant’s terminology, are considered as nec-
essary preconditions to make physics. As it is well known and Einstein liked
to insist, without any of them, physical thinking in the familiar sense would
not be possible (Einstein, 1971). These principles are: the principle of realism
(already introduced above); causality; the continuous time flow ; individuation;
and locality.
It is not easy to know when and how these principles were first intuited. The
most plausible hypothesis is that they had survival advantages for humankind.
No matter how it was, those principles crystallized as a final consequence of
the XVI century scientific revolution and its influence remain today with us.
Although well known, we will briefly introduce them for completion3.
As far as the principle of realism is concerned, it is conceptually useful to
make a distinction between its meaning in the “broad sense” and in the “re-
stricted sense”. This distinction is irrelevant in classical physics, but, as we will
see, is pertinent in quantum physics that is realist in the broad sense, but not
in the restricted sense.
In the “broad sense”, this principle postulates the existence of a material
reality out there and independent of us. In the “restricted sense” it affirms that
the world is composed by separable (see below) objects that have properties
with well defined values. A measurement of the property, correctly carried out
with a suitably calibrated device, will reveal the pre-existing value of the prop-
erty. In the field of research called Foundations of Quantum Physics (Freire,
2004), these properties with well defined values are called, for historical reasons
in which we cannot enter now, EPR elements of reality (Einstein et al., 1935).
The individuation principle states that things like particles, fields, etc., that
have a real existence independent of the perceiving subject, are arranged in a
2We accept the reductionist program as a start point, but not the arrogant part of the
program. Leaving apart knickknacks like life, language, consciousness, etc, impossible to
reduce and hence emergent, the situation in physics is that the standard model of particles
has about 20 free constants and the cosmological one about 15, including dark energy and
matter. Each of these constants represents something that we ignore. The state of the art
today is that nobody knows, and no theory explains, why they have the values they have.
In fact, going beyond the Standard Model to the, at present, deepest formulation of string
theory, the so-called String/M theory, there is no question as to whether such constants are
not actually “fundamental”, in the sense that their values could not be determined from first
principles, similarly as the Kepler radii in the solar system cannot be calculated in Newtons
(or Einsteins) theory of gravitation. They play the role of initial conditions lying outside the
fundamental laws.
3Both, classical physics and relativity theory satisfy all of them. Time, whatever it would
be, has the same role in classical and quantum physics, so we will leave it out of our discussion.
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space-time continuum. At a certain time, and provided these objects are far
apart in the space, they may claim an independent existence of one another.
This same idea is sometimes stated by saying that the objects in question are
separable.
The locality principle is interwoven with the previous ones. It postulates
that if we have two objects A and B spatially separated, in the relativity theory
sense, any external influence over A has no direct influence on B. It could be
also stated by saying that actions-at-a-distance are not allowed in physics.
Once more, it is conceptually useful to distinguish between locality in the
broad and in the restricted sense. In the broad sense, is the principle that we
have just stated above. In the restricted sense, it declares that even if these
direct influences exist, they cannot be utilized to send information with super-
luminal velocity. In this form, it is sometimes called the non-signaling condition
and, as it is very well known, no conflict between it and relativity theory arises:
even if the spatially separated particle B “instantaneously feels something”, this
subtle influence cannot be used to send messages. A theory could be local in the
restricted sense and not in the broad sense, as it is again the case of quantum
theory.
Although separability (individuation) and locality are closely related (they
coincide in classical physics), they are in general different principles. There exist
states in quantum theory that are local but no-separable, as for example some
Werner states (Werner, 1989).
It is usually understood that there is causality if every event has a set of
antecedent circumstances from which the event follows according to a rule. This
statement has two different parts, namely: the initial conditions, to be measured,
and the physical law, given by a differential equation. Using this definition, as
these equations have a unique solution, the same initial conditions, the same
causes, will produce always the same effects4. In classical physics, the rule will
be given by the equations of motion of Newton, Lagrange or Hamilton, and
in non relativistic quantum physics, by Schrdinger equation. This implies, as
Laplace noted, that if we knew the initial conditions (position and momentum)
of all the particles in the universe, we would know the future for all time. As
this definition uses a time sequence and we have left time out of our discussion,
in what follows we will understand causality as the closely related principle that
declares that the effects are uniquely and completely determined by its causes.
In physics, this view of nature is called determinism5.
4Bohr, however, used to relate this principle to the conservation principles (Bohr, 1958,
1963).
5We are forgetting now the chaotic cases. Chaos occurs when a system depends in a sensi-
tive way on its previous state. We will leave this problem outside of our discussion. Nonethe-
less, it should be pointed out that chaos implies indeterminism only in a practical sense, but
not in a strictly fundamental one, and this makes it different from quantum indeterminism,
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A few comments are now in order. The first one is that, although we had said
that those principles constitute the epistemological backbone of sciences, clas-
sical physics in particular, Newtonian gravitation was non-local in both senses,
contradicting our arguments. Yet, it is also true that since its introduction,
Newton perceived it as to be simply unintelligible, as a provisional expedient
to be eliminated from physics. He even thought about different possibilities to
avoid the actions at a distance. In a letter to Boyle and in query 21 of the Op-
tics he speculated, for example, about the existence of a substance, called ether,
that would penetrated all matter as a medium for the gravitational interactions.
The second has to do with an apparent contradiction related to determin-
ism. Both, Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics are at variance with it.
However, it is generally accepted that this is not a question of principle, but a
practical one.
The last comment refers to the old argument that in a total deterministic,
Laplacian world there is no way for free will. We would have only the illusion
of being free to choose. This might be a shared but incorrect conclusion. We
cannot enter into this discussion here but Squires, for example, maintains that
to have free will, determinism would be a necessary condition (Squires, 1990).
3 Pros And Cons Of The Traditional Method-
ology Of Science
The traditional manner of doing science outlined above as a general synthesis is
based on the validity of the four principles stated. Our thesis is that only if these
four principles, in the restricted and broad sense in its case, work, then it make
sense to freely study how nature would be in our absence. This is the mechanism
that allows us to think that there is a world out there compound by a plurality
of individual objects, which have an independent existence, whose properties
have pre-existing values that will be revealed by our operations. From this ap-
proach, the external world has, thus, an immutable legality to be discovered and
reflected in laws. In the old days, these laws were conferred by God. Today
it is believed that they are “inherent” in the Big Bang, from the beginning of
time, and we, humans, are detached passive observers that have nothing to do
with this legality. Being these laws established from the beginning and forever,
our role as outside observers could only be to discover and to reflect them in
our theories. If we discover bad laws, as in the phlogiston case, we are doing
spurious science. If we discover the good ones, we are doing genuine science.
From this point of view, the scientific method consist in gradually uncover the
real essence of the phenomena, the objective reality, the “thing in itself”. This
is the most plausible meaning of “in our absence”.
which is really fundamental.
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As we have already noted, the success of this method until the beginning
of the XX century is indubitable. Classical physics worked it out to perfec-
tion. For the long period between the scientific revolution and the XX century,
we were able to remove our interventions into nature completely and to ex-
plain the phenomena as if we were seeing “the truth”, as if we were detached
observers of a structured and finished reality that is just out there in front of us.
This same success is the reason why this research program is so attractive
that still today the great majority of the scientific community firmly believes
that his task is to find out how nature really is. As we have already mentioned
in the introduction, it explains with simplicity why we all see the same things.
The idea of truth as a fair reflection, (alternatively, as a correspondence with),
of what really is. The partial utility of superseded theories; or even why we have
little control over which theories seem to be “temporally” correct. Yet, it is the
origin of the true impulse behind our individual research efforts. However, it
also has weaknesses. Let us consider some of them6.
The first one is the following. The mentioned success has also given us the
greatest confidence that at the macroscopic level, objects are what they look like.
But are they really? If that were the case it would be difficult to understand why
Newton was unable to discover the electromagnetic fields surrounding him; or
why a skilled man like Galileo didn’t discover the black holes; or W. Thomson,
the dark energy; etc. How can we understand hundreds of facts like those if we
begin by thinking that we are detached observers of a structured physical reality
that lies just in front of us finished in its minute details? Why are we not able
to grasp it as it is, to “discover” it in a definite way, once and forever? A clear
explanation of the permanent imperfection of our grasping and of the elusive-
ness of the “essences” will be much welcome. Note that this sounds also as a
great defeat : for at least the last 200 years generation after generation of young
and clever researches have been unable to see what lies just in front of their eyes.
The second is the following. Imagine that we go back in time. We do this
kind of exercise to draw conclusions in cosmology, or in the theory of evolution,
etc. If we go back 110 years, then quantum and relativity theories disappear. 110
years more, and statistical mechanics, electromagnetism, etc., also disappear.
Another 110 years back and even Newtonian classical mechanics disappear. If
we follow with this exercise and go even back, not only laws and theories disap-
pear. It is doubtful that 3.500 years ago we had conscious minds (Snell, 1982;
Jaynes, 2000); that 10.000 years ago we had writing; and it seems that if we go
back another thousands years more, even language disappears. Is it sound to
think about the existence of laws and theories without conscious minds, writing
6We do not think we understand these epistemic-ontological problems better than philoso-
phers do. Many philosophers have been engaged in this type of reflection throughout their
entire life. We assume, therefore, that some of them may find the discussion that follows (and
the one in pages 18 to 21) hopelessly naive.
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and language? Is it an unjustified belief? Or, is only a metaphor?
The third one is the following. Let us accept for a moment that “natural
laws” are “laws of nature”. In that case, they can be only a “partial set of laws”.
It is an undeniable fact that the more important advances in sciences have arisen
not through the study of phenomena as they occur in nature, but to the study
of phenomena produced by technological means. This is, for example, how his-
torically quantum physics was build up. Its principles were introduced thanks
to the previous technological development, and therefore, in our presence. They
changed completely our conception of how the world is and, nowadays, quantum
principles are utilized to conjecture how the world could be at the beginning,
that is, in our absence. Is not the “traditional” realist methodology surrepti-
tiously reintroducing the subject at this point?
The fourth one is the non-trivial change of laws and theories, implicit in
the previous comments. As this has been extensively studied by philosophers
of science, we will give only the example of Kepler’s laws to illustrate what we
mean. The non-trivial changes from Newton dynamics to relativity theory or
from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics are also well known examples
to argue with. The question is: do Kepler’s laws uncover the real essence of
the phenomena? From the point of view of the realist methodology, the answer
should be yes. However, we know for sure that they work only for short times
and in the two-body approximation; that the ellipses are given in a plane, while
the heavenly bodies move in a three-dimensional space, etc. To make a long
story short: History of physics shows that with the unique exception of current
laws and theories, all previous theories have been proved to be limited in one
way or another and have become surpassed by the new knowledge and the new
order introduced by us. It is what E. Wigner once called the ephemeral nature
of physical theories (Wigner, 1967). These changes of laws and theories have
also been accompanied by the corresponding change in our descriptions, our
images, our explanations and the “truth” of what really was going on.
These non trivial changes of theories are difficult to swallow. If the laws
really were “laws of nature” describing the essence of things: why are they so
ephemeral, poor and changeable? It seems to us that implicit in this methodol-
ogy is the unexplained idea that in any concrete moment of the human devel-
opment there are “parts of material reality” that are out of our reach, and that
we progressively increase our knowledge incorporating new parts. Why it is so?
Where do these parts come from?
The fifth and more serious difficulty for us to accept this point of view is
standard quantum theory. The methodology we are now trying to weight up is
implicitly and explicitly based on the four principles stated in part 2: realism in
the broad and restricted senses; sufficient reason; individuation; and locality in
the broad and restricted senses. Einstein was right in this respect: if we want
to find out how nature really is in our absence, then those principles must be
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satisfied. The problem is that, as we will demonstrate in the next paragraph,
they are incompatible with the most productive interpretation of our best theory
ever. Hence, the methodology based on them cannot be a satisfactory method-
ology.
4 A Succint Version Of Entanglement Swapping
Entanglement swapping (ES in what follows) is a phenomenon in which the
entanglement between two particles is teleported to other distant particles by
performing suitable joint measurements and broadcasting the results as classical
information allowing so a distant observer to make the appropriate selection.
The protocol were proposed in 1993 (Zukowski et al., 1993) and experimentally
verified in 2002 (Jennewein et al., 2002), using the standard interpretation of
quantum formalism (see, for example, (Cohen-Tannoudji et al., 1977)).
Imagine that two sources A and B, separated at a cosmological distance, pre-
pare pairs of particles represented by a singlet state: |Ψ−〉i,j =
1√
2
[
|01〉i,j − |10〉i,j
]
,
and that the source A emits particles 1 and 2, and the source B does the same
at the same time with particles 3 and 4. The sources also emit one pair per
minute. The figure 1 shows schematically the hypothetical experiment.
Figure 1: Schematic picture of entanglement swapping.
As the description of the experiment made manifest, particles 1 and 4 have not
interacted in the past and therefore in principle they have nothing to do with
each other. However, 1 is strongly anticorrelated with 2, and similarly 3 with 4.
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The joint state of the four particles is given by:
|Ψ 〉1,2,3,4 =
1
2
[(|01〉 − |10〉)1,2 ⊗ (|01〉 − |10〉)3,4]
=
1
2
[|0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉 + |1010〉]1,2,3,4 (1). (1)
This joint state |ψ〉1,2,3,4contains complete information about all possible results
of measurements carried out upon any part of the four system particles. By this
we meant that if you determine the state of any part of the system, the other
part would be left in the relative state corresponding to the one you have found,
as expressed by (1). For example, if you measure only the spin of the particle 1
in the direction OZ and you get the result|0〉, then the particles 2, 3 and 4 will be
found, in the corresponding joint measurement, in one of the states |101〉2,3,4or
|110〉2,3,4with equal probability. You will never find |111〉2,3,4or |000〉2,3,4, let us
say.
If now you make instead the measurement σˆz2 ⊗ σˆz3 upon the pair 2 and 3
in zone D of space, the particles 1 and 4, which might be spatially separated,
“instantaneously” become correlated at-a-distance in the direction OZ. For ex-
ample, imagine that you get in your measurement the state |00〉2,3. If someone
carries out in that very instant and in zone C of the space the measurement
σˆz,1 ⊗ σˆz,4, she will find with certainty that both spins 1 and 4 are down, that
is, she will find the relative state7 |11〉1,4. This “formal” prediction can be
tested. To this end, observer in zone D must send to observer in zone C in-
formation about her results. Otherwise, the observer in zone C, will have no
idea neither about the direction, nor upon which concrete subsystems she has
to measure.
If we carry out a different measurement upon particles 2 and 3, for example
a Bell measurement, particles 1 and 4 become now maximally correlated in any
direction8. The correctness of this prediction can be verified experimentally by
testing the CHSH inequality (Clauser et al., 1969). If we use pairs (1+4) that
correspond to particles 2 and 3 not measured, the inequality would be satisfied.
However, if we broadcast the results and, using this information, someone se-
lects in zone C of the space the sub ensemble of pairs (1+4) that corresponds to
7This is evident if you write down the state (1) in the following form:
|Ψ 〉
1,2,3,4=
1
2
[
|01〉
1,4 ⊗ |10〉2,3 − |00〉1,4 ⊗ |11〉2,3 − |11〉1,4 ⊗ |00〉2,3+|10〉1,4 ⊗ |01〉2,3
]
.
(2)
8Again, this is trivial if you write (2) above in the following form:
|Ψ〉1,2,3,4 =
1
2
[∣∣Ψ+〉
1,4
⊗
∣∣Ψ+〉
2,3
−
∣∣Ψ−〉
1,4
⊗
∣∣Ψ−〉
2,3
−
∣∣Φ+〉
1,4
⊗
∣∣Φ+〉
2,3
+
∣∣Φ−〉
1,4
⊗
∣∣Φ−〉
2,3
]
(3)
where
∣∣Ψ±〉 and ∣∣Φ±〉 are the four Bell states: ∣∣Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|01〉 ± |10〉] and∣∣Φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|00〉 ± |11〉] .
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pairs 2 and 3 that have been submitted to a Bell measurement with the result
|Ψ−〉2,3 , for example, then the inequality would be violated. Pairs (1+4) have
become now entangled at a distance. This post-selection procedure is the one
used to test the prediction. We should not underestimate the importance of this
protocol. ES is predicted to be a basic element in quantum repeaters in future
information technologies.
What is new and surprising in the previous description is that, before this
protocol was introduced, it was thought that entanglement needed the interac-
tion between two or more particles. Nonetheless, the formalism predicts that
particles can be entangled without direct interaction. As we have explained, all
the information is contained in the whole, the state |ψ〉1,2,3,4. This information
combined with the new knowledge obtained by measuring in zone D, determines
the relative state of any sub ensemble in zone C, and their internal correlations.
Therefore, we conclude that provided this information is transferred, the type
of correlation of each individual subsystem (1+4) is established instantaneously
at-a-distance by measuring over the subsystem (2+3) and, hence, that the pure
state that describes afterwards each individual pair (1+4) is different depend-
ing on the kind of measurement and the result obtained in a spatially separated
region of the space.
A question now arises, namely: what is the “cause” of entanglement? The
following inferences could be made in this respect. If there were no selection,
then the final state of the ensemble made up by all the particles (1+4) corre-
sponding to pairs (2+3) that have been submitted to a Bell measurement would
be:
ρ1,4 = tr2,3 ρ1,2,3,4 =
1
4
Iˆ, (4)
where Iˆ is the unity matrix in Hilbert space of dimension 4. This state asso-
ciated to particles (1+4) is separable. This implies that we are not going to
have a violation of any Bell inequality (Bell, 1987) using pairs in this state. The
fact that it be possible to choose a sub ensemble of pairs (1+4) that violates
Bell’s inequality, manifests that pairs that have never met before are indeed
entangled after carrying out measurements at a spatially separated region. The
broadcasting of the results (classical information) and the posterior selection of
pairs (1+4) based on them are therefore necessary conditions9 for the swapping
protocol to be realized, but they are not sufficient. Let us argue this point more
carefully. The issue to address is this: is it the transfer of classical informa-
tion and the posterior selection the “cause” of the entanglement we are looking
for, or can we make the (im)plausible hypothesis that the pairs (1+4) were en-
tangled “instantaneously” by the successive Bell measurements? We know for
9This information is, in our opinion, the relevant element of the famous sentence that
Bohr wrote in 1935 answering the EPR paper: “But even at this stage, there is essentially the
question of an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions
regarding the future behaviour of the system” (emphasis by Bohr, in Einstein (1970), p. 234).
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sure that if no Bell measurements were carried out upon particles 2 and 3, no
entangled pairs (1+4) at all could be selected. We also know that if the Bell
measurements are carried out but no information is broadcast, and hence no
selection is done or is done by chance, no violation of CHSH inequality would
be produced. Therefore, we conclude that the broadcasting of information plus
post selection are necessary conditions to entangle the pairs but that it is only
their conjunction with the Bell measurement what makes all three sufficient
for ES. Can we go beyond and infer that somehow the entanglement between
particles (1+4) is produced by the physical interaction between particles 2 and
3 brought about by the measurement upon them? We do not have a clear
answer but, if we look at the expression (3), we see that the possibility that
they were instantaneously entangled by those measurements is included in the
initial state |ψ〉1,2,3,4. This state predicts that if particles 2 and 3 interact in
the appropriate way, the effect of this interaction is somehow transferred to the
subsystem (1+4). This inference is reinforced by the fact that if the pairs were
really entangled one by one with each Bell measurement, the density matrix ρˆ1,4
representing the state of all that pairs, would be an equal mixture of the four
Bell sates, as expression (3) predicts. Now if you make this simple calculation
you will get expression (4), supporting our previous argument. If this inference
sounds peculiar, as may well happen, the conceptual “interference” would come,
once again, from common sense. We are accustomed to think that, for example,
money plus money gives more money, but here we see that this “true” is not
favored by quantum formalism: entanglement plus entanglement might give a
separable state, that is, no entanglement at all. Another quantum surprise!
We reach therefore, the following conclusions from our analysis10,
1st : that the relative state of particles (1+4), and so the correlations to be
uncovered between them, depend on the measurement and choice made
at a spatially separated zone of the space. And,
2nd : that the measurement does not “reveal” a particular set of previous cor-
relations. The correlations between particles 1 and 4 do not have their
origin in an interaction in the past. They must, accordingly, be “created”
in the measurement. However, if they are created in the measurement,
then one of two things: either there is not “enough reality” to account
for what occurs (Lapiedra, 2007) or material reality is partially undefined.
In any of these two cases, it is obvious that we are not “getting closer”
or “grasping more fully” or establishing an impossible “one-to-one corre-
spondence” with something that still does not exist.
10The account we have given should be sufficient to understand why this protocol cannot
be exploited to send signals at superluminal velocity.
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5 The Breaking Of Classical Principles (and Ein-
stein’s Critical Realism)
We briefly explain now how the classical principles introduced in part 2 are
violated in this concrete example. Realism in the restricted sense is violated
because the individual particles 1, 2, 3 and 4, do not have spins with a well
defined value in any direction, a pre-existing value that the measurement would
reveal. The sense of the spin in any direction is “defined” (created) in the same
measurement, so EPR elements of reality do not pre-exist (Mermin, 1983). As
just explained above, the same can be predicated about the correlations: they
are not new EPR elements of reality either.
Determinism is violated because the effect is not completely and uniquely
determined by its causes. The technician making Bell measurements in zone D
and knowing the joint pure state (3) will get, for exactly the same initial con-
ditions, the result |Ψ+〉2,3 in 25% of the cases, the result |Ψ
−〉2,3 in 25% of the
cases, and so on. There is nothing she can do to improve or modify the statis-
tic. Quantum theory is an essentially probabilistic theory, whatever “essential”
might signify here. The individual results occur without deterministic law. This
is crucial, because, as we have already emphasized, it allows the compatibility
with relativity theory: signaling is impossible using quantum formalism.
The locality principle in the broad sense is violated because the state of the
particles 1 and 4 can be prepared at a distance by a measurement upon particles
2 and 3 in the region D.
Finally, the individuation principle is violated because in this phenomenon
is not possible to separate the state of particles (1+4) from the interaction of
particles (2+3) with the measuring device. That is, at that precise moment,
particles 1 and 4 “feel something” that entangles them. As previously discuss,
we must confess that we do not have a concrete proposal to understand what
this “telepathic coupling”, to use Einstein words (Jammer, 1974), p. 494, could
be.
We have utilized entanglement swapping to demonstrate the violation of
these four principles. This is only one example. As a matter of fact, any scholar
working in the field knows that these experimental violations are contained
in the principles postulated by quantum theory. In our opinion, the so-called
“weirdness” of quantum theory is related to this violation of the principles of
realism in the restricted sense, determinism, locality in the broad sense and
individuation.
The distinction we have made between broad and restricted sense in two of
the principles, has been introduced to help to eliminate some confusion about
the nature of the quantum principles. For many researchers, quantum theory
13
is both realist and local, while for many others it is, neither realist, nor local.
There is really no contradiction at all. They might be even saying the same
thing. If we take realism in the restricted sense, quantum theory is not realist,
but if we take it in the broad sense it is indeed realist. Something similar could
be predicated about locality. If we take it in the broad sense, quantum theory is
non-local. However, if we take it in the restricted sense, it is local. Another form
of expressing the same thing would be to say that quantum theory is a realist
theory, but the EPR elements of reality do not exist, and that it is non-local but
this non-locality does not allow sending information at superluminal velocity.
This summarizes, and we hope, clarifies, the contradictory opinions that can be
read in the foundations of quantum physics field.
There are some variants of “realist interpretations” and alternative formal-
ism, like Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952); dynamical collapse theories (Ghirardi et al.,
1986); transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cramer, 1986); etc.,
that uphold some of the previous principles, but not all of them. The more they
uphold, the more expensive is the price they have to pay. It is not the objective
of this paper to discuss these alternatives and to analyze, for example, how they
understand entanglement swapping. We see them as defensive strategies that
philosophically look to the past, not to the future. In fact, they have been al-
ways behind the developments of standard quantum theory, like for example in
the case of quantum information, and in the last four or five decades they have
been unable to produce anything fundamentally new. This is the reason why,
rather than looking back and try to defend how the world is in our absence, our
objective will be to disclose how the world could be if the standard interpretation
of quantum formalism is considered correct.
6 The Resistance Of Established Principles To
Be Relegated
Limiting our arguments to physics, the “most fundamental” of all sciences in
the uncritical reductionist program, it is an historical fact that in the past,
whenever some principles showed their limitation to encompass new empirical
evidence and new principles were introduced to do it, a strong resistance to
abandon the old principles and to embrace the new ones emerged. This conser-
vative attitude should be applied to the new principles, to allow them to show
their potentialities, but it is usually doomed to failure with the old ones.
The arguments used today to reject standard quantum formalism can be
summarized by saying that, to the detractors, the new quantum principles are
regarded as doubtful, confusing, obscure and even absurd11. Even if the theory
11 This is again a crude exposition. A detailed analysis would take us far away from our
main objectives.
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is coherent and in perfect agreement with all the observed facts, as it is the case,
its “true meaning” is disputed. Besides, part of the empirical evidence that sup-
ports it, is carefully scrutinized to find loopholes. Good critical work is always
welcome (Santos, 2009). However, the main objective of some of these maneu-
vers seems to maintain safe the old established principles and the common sense
related to them. In these last cases, the acceptance of the new theory does not
depend on its merits, but upon whether it is compatible with the established
principles or not. If it is not, as it is the case with quantum theory, then it
cannot be the “truth”, and must be completed, revised or rejected, as in the
alternative proposals quoted above. This is nothing new. On the contrary, it
seems to have been the normal rule in the history of physics. Let us remember
briefly the well known examples of Copernicus and Newton.
Despite its agreement with the observed phenomena, the Copernicus system
was strongly criticized on the basis that its principles were apparently absurd.
This was the shared opinion not only inside the Catholic Church, but also by
scholars like Francis Bacon, one of the pioneers of the empirical science. For
Bacon, Copernicus’ principles were “the speculations of one who cares not what
fictions he introduces into nature, provided his calculations answer” (Bacon,
1653). One century later, Newton’s theory got a similar criticism. Not only
from Berkeley. Leibniz, a practicing scientist who made important contribu-
tions to mathematics and physics, considered both, the inertia principle and
the gravitation law as absurd and even false. In both cases, Copernicus and
Newton, the real reason behind the criticism and the rejection was uniquely the
contradiction between the new principles introduced by their respective theories
and the Aristotelian well established principles.
If we were interested in learning the lesson from the past, it would be a good
exercise to have a look at what happened afterwards. Two things are interesting
in this respect. In the following decades, the range of physical phenomena that
were in perfect agreement with the new principles increased dramatically. On
the other hand, those new principles allowed new theoretical derivations that
gave a more profound understanding of the theory. These two facts changed
slowly but inexorably the attitude of the next generations, to the paradoxical
point that, after another century, and until today, the principles introduced
by Copernicus and Newton were considered as “self evident principles”. Let
us make only two quotes. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant declared that
objective empirical knowledge could only be achieved if individual laws were for-
mulated according to Newton’s principles. And half a century later, Helmholtz
wrote: “The task of physical science is finally to reduce all phenomena of nature
to forces of attraction and repulsion, the intensity of which is dependent only
upon the mutual distance of material bodies. Only if this problem is solved, we
can be sure that nature is conceivable” (quoted from Whitrow (1950)).
This brief historical, and to some extent slanted, reminder shows something
that we all know: established principles, laws and theories have always been
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displaced by the new ones, and in many cases the new ideas were strongly criti-
cized because they violated the previous ones. It is a fact that physical theories
have always been changed when our interventions into nature establish new re-
lations that are neither predicted, nor embraced by the current theory in any
convenient way. If we consider that there are philosophical principles that can
be derived from pure reason, it is evident that they can never be modified. But
this is not what has happened.
We should not underestimate this lesson from the past. The argument by
Einstein that the principles of realism, individuation, determinism and locality
are necessary “preconditions” to postulate laws which can be checked empiri-
cally (Einstein, 1971), is similar to the arguments made by Berkeley (and by
Kant). There is only a change in the principles. When people claim that quan-
tum theory is a valuable description of observed facts that does not give us
neither a “real understanding”, not a description of what is “really” going on,
an ontology of physical reality, they are reproducing Bacon attacks. The real
meaning of all this criticism is that the principles of quantum physics, the for-
malism compacted in four or five postulates, are in contradiction with those
“evident and well established” previous principles.
7 A Critical Discussion About The Methodol-
ogy Of Quantum Physics
We have seen that quantum theory strongly suggests that the traditional method-
ology is inadequate at the microscopic level, thus invalidating its role as a general
methodology. The alternative is then: either non relativistic quantum theory in
its standard version is wrong, or the traditional methodology of science based
on those principles is misleading. In what follows we will take the second al-
ternative and we will try to infer how the world could be like if the standard
interpretation of quantum theory were true.
To this end we will adopt the strategy that the traditional methodology does
in fact work at the macroscopic level but not in the microscopic one. We will
keep then realism in the broad sense, but we will reject it in the restricted sense.
The immediate ontological outcome of this decision is to put aside the EPR ele-
ments of reality. However, if the systems do not have preexistent defined values
for a concrete property, let us say the spin, then the values must be created in
the same act of measurement. The consequences are twofold.
On the one hand, we cannot maintain the program of how the world really
is in our absence. If the kind of correlation in ES or the EPR elements of reality
are created by measurement, our presence becomes essential. The change is
then dramatic: we pass from being in a cool and alien universe, in which we
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are mere descriptive spectators, to a participative one (Wheeler, 1996), one in
which our free decisions count and therefore the subject cannot be altogether
eliminated.
On the other hand, the material world does not manifest to us as something
finished in its minute details, but as something partially undefined. Remem-
ber that quantum entities can behave like particles or waves, depending on
our choice, on how we decide to observe them. This indefiniteness evokes us
Dirac’s statement about material reality. According to Dirac, the fundamental
laws of nature, as stated by non relativistic quantum theory, do not govern the
world as it appears in our mental picture in any direct way, but they control
“a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing
irrelevancies” (Dirac, 1930).
It is convenient at this point to make a distinction between material reality
and physical reality. Material reality, or matter is by definition the undefined
Dirac substratum, and physical reality is a social construction that we build up
based on our current laws and theories. Let us put the stale example of the desk.
For a physicist it is almost empty space: atoms in a particular order. However,
for people drinking beer in a pub it is a defined piece of wood, a solid object.
Rigorously speaking, things are not what they seem to be to the common sense.
Sciences define what things are. If theories of science change, what things are,
and this is valid from the tiniest parts to the whole universe, change accordingly.
We do not know any permanent physical reality. The material reality, or the
substratum, might be the same the physical reality is not. The reason behind
this distinction is that our concepts and the substratum are, presumably, very
different things. Concepts are associated with our personal and social experi-
ences. The substratum is not. Therefore, there is no a priori reason to think
that the essence of material reality can be reproduced directly in the world of
our laws and theories. How could we justify a supposedly isomorphism between
two things of such a different nature? We cannot. And if there is not an isomor-
phism, the ideas of reflection and correspondence become not only obscure, but
incomprehensible. This is why we adopt the point of view according to which
our laws and theories allow us to introduce order in our experience. But the
success in introducing order in our experience does not secure the correspon-
dence between theories and the substratum, as manifested by the non trivial
change of theories. The object of physics would not be then to make a mental
or mathematical “image” reproducing material reality in its minute details, a
one-to-one mapping, but to increase its utility for us by putting order in our
experience.
As far as the other principles are concerned, we reject them all. This takes
us to the following situation. We have now the principle of realism in the broad
sense, plus quantum mechanical formalism. Our task is to sketch a homogeneous
methodology of physics based not in a philosophical erudite analysis, but look-
ing carefully at how quantum theory really works, and drawing the pertinent
17
conclusions from there. We have seen how it works in part 4 of this essay. The
first thing we want to call the attention to is the fact that in part 4 the formal-
ism was applied only to the isolated system |ψ〉1,2,3,4, but neither to the sources,
nor to the devices that were performing the measurements. The preparing and
measuring devices are described in terms of the operations that the technicians,
that have previously calibrated the apparatus, “know how” to do to get the re-
sults. This amounts to posit the inapplicability of quantum formalism to some
part of the measurement process. To be more concrete, eighty-six years of re-
search have shown that, due to the very existence of the quantum, it is not
possible to control the reaction of the object on the measuring device, as Bohr
anticipated (Bohr, 1958). This fact splits the world in two parts: the quantum
system to which the theory applies, and the rest of the world, in particular the
measurements apparatus, to which the theory does not apply. This partition of
the world into “systems and observers” with an arbitrary line, was very unsatis-
factory for many people, John Bell being one of them. For Bell “the possibility
of a homogeneous account of the world” recovering the old principles, was the
chief motivation to study hidden variable theories (Bell, 1987. See also Jam-
mer,1974, p. 253). Lack of space does not allow us to justify properly why
we contemplate this understanding of the formalism with a division line as the
one with the lesser conceptual difficulties. Loosely speaking it coincides with
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory as explained mainly, but not
only, by Bohr (Bohr, 1958, 1963), Heisenberg (Heisenberg, 1958) and Stapp
(Stapp, 1972), and also with the variant introduced by von Neumann, London,
Bauer and Wigner. We will justify this choice in a separate paper.
Let us go back to our main objective. Our task was to elaborate a homo-
geneous methodology of modern physics according with realism in the broad
sense and the new principles introduced by non relativistic quantum theory,
without any other commitments. As discussed above, our approach is that
these principles are applied only to the quantum phenomenon, not to the de-
vices and, therefore, a division line between the subject and the object must
be introduced. Consequently, the interchangeable subject cannot be altogether
removed, conclusion that we had already reached by a different path. This is
a strong indication that, to use a metaphor, in the same manner that the land
of an island finishes at the mobile water edge, the construction of sciences fin-
ishes at the edge of our interventions, not at the edge of the essences, of the
thing in itself. Physics is compatible with the postulation of the thing in itself,
but it does not need this postulate to make sense. The thing in itself can be
understood as a desired referent, but definitely it is not what sciences reach.
It is in this sense that there is no science of the essences, or science in our
absence: the construction of sciences finishes at the level of human experience.
This is for us one of the epistemological lessons to extract from quantum theory.
We summarize our arguments about the indispensable role of the subject in
making science in a theorem:
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Theorem 1. The events known by nobody, do not exist (for science).
Proof. Obvious.
Corollary 1. Unperformed experiments have no results.
Proof. See Peres (1978).
A brief comment about the theorem seems to be now necessary. In cosmol-
ogy the Universe is observed not as it is at this very moment, but as it was
a few years ago, or 4 billions of years ago, and based on this information and
general relativity, we make suitable assumptions avoiding contradictions. As
the information changes, we modify accordingly what we can say about it. This
evokes the Berkeley’s old question: has the tree fallen in the forest if nobody
was there? From our point of view the answer was given some 40 years ago by
von Weizscker: “what is observed, certainly exist; about what is not observed
we are still free to make suitable assumptions. This freedom is then used to
avoid paradoxes” (Weizsa¨cker, 1971).
We have gathered in the previous pages, by a close examination of our best
theory, enough elements to advance in our purpose to conjecture an alternative
methodology. Those elements are:
• The principle of realism in the broad sense.
• The principles of quantum mechanics, as used in part 4th.
• The mutability of laws and theories.
• The conjecture that physical reality is indeed an objective social construc-
tion (explained in page 16).
• The division line between macroscopic and microscopic levels, introduced
in page 17.
• The fact that observer-participancy matters. If the values of the physical
magnitudes (or the correlations) are created in the measurement, as we
have shown with ES, then our role and our choices deciding with measure-
ment to take are relevant. (See page 12 above).
A general methodology of science incorporating those elements could be suc-
cinctly conjectured as follows. Since the mists of time, humans have interacted
with their environment (with material reality, whatever this would be), first with
their hands, sense organs, ideas or beliefs and then with their technological de-
vices. In this process, undifferentiated material reality was decomposed into
pieces and composed once again differently. We began to hold pieces of matter,
to manipulate them (bones and stones as weapons, for example), to make mate-
rial operations with our surrounding material reality. It was this manipulation
towards survival which, in the becoming of time and over many thousands of
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years gave rise, from that undifferentiated material reality, to pieces of matter,
then to “unconscious concepts”, and finally to something that we now regard as
“material objects”. Objects are, therefore, seen here as the result of an efficient
interaction with the environment done with survival purposes.
It was the subsequent manipulation with these material objects what estab-
lished recursive relations. These relations were used to build up new material
objects and new relations, and so on. Undifferentiated material reality gave
way to “unconscious concepts”, then to physical objects “as postulated entities
which simplify our account of the flux of existence” (Quine 1980), and finally
to relations summarized in a certain algorithm able to reproduce all relations
of that class. This is what we designate as a natural law. From this “operative
mindset”, the scientific laws appear not as inalterable “laws of nature”, but as
our own constructions: computational algorithms that allow to condensate and
reproduce an enormous variety of relations between objects and between macro-
scopic devices. It was these everlasting interventions in a malleable nature what
shaped our world, introduced order in material reality and mental evolution in
human beings. The most plausible concatenation seems to have been: uncon-
scious concepts → objects → sign language → spoken language → writing →
conscious mind → laws and theories. We do not need to invert this sequence to
understand the origin of our theories. Unconscious concepts, objects, language,
consciousness, laws and theories appear in this methodology as social construc-
tions, submitted to change and evolution because each of them are products
of the previous order that we had introduced in any concrete field of human
activity. Science is seen here in continuity with all other human activities: a
survival activity resting on preceding knowledge obtained depending on both,
the material substratum and the particular state of evolution of our extended
mind.
The described sequence, with “unconscious concepts” at the beginning and
conscious minds almost at the end needs an explanation that we succinctly give
now. We can introduce it with the following question: what came first, concepts
or objects? Can we have “objects” before we have concepts? In our opinion,
the answer should be an unqualified yes. Let us explain this point with a few
examples. The antelope has the concept of “lion”. It runs away as soon as it
sees one close by. The same can be affirmed in the case of the bees. They have
the concept of “flower”. Both, the antelope and the bee, have the “concepts”,
but they are not conscious concepts in the same manner as we have them12.
These are the “unconscious concepts” introduced above. If our approach is cor-
rect, the unconscious concepts predate objects and conscious minds: concepts
do not require consciousness. Jaynes’ theory, which we follow in this concrete
point, contends that it is possible to conceive of humans with all the traits of
learning, reason, language, and so on, but not consciousness (Jaynes, 2000).
12We are indebted to Prof. T. Calvo for calling our attention to this point.
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Note that, in the previous scenario and as far as the material reality con-
cerns, the order introduced is not arbitrary. Not everything goes. In fact, it is
independent of our individual will. Matter has its own legality, revealed by its
resistance to our operations, by the fact that some of the things we do work and
others do not. Those that work show invariants, regularities that we express
in laws. These empirical pressures are the sure indication that material reality
has legality. Quantum theory reminds us that this legality has manifested itself
only through our interventions.
This approach allows understanding why the traditional methodology worked
so well in the past. It was due to the fact that then the level of organization
of human experience was incipient and the division line between subject and
object was unnecessary. In such a situation we could remove our interventions
completely. While that happened, the traditional methodology was sufficient
and the phenomena were explained as if it were given in our absence. The sec-
ond epistemological lesson of quantum theory is that actually the process is just
the contrary. It is only once we have objects, language, consciousness, laws and
theories that we can give the jump and contrive how the world would be in our
absence. But this re-construction requires the introduction of a subject that
has been not a passive observer, but an active agent trying to solve old problems
with new methods and new problems with creativity and imagination.
Let us finish our proposal addressing a point that, perhaps, some readers
have now in mind. If the construction of sciences finishes at the level of hu-
man experience, what about the “truth” of our theories? In the macroscopic
side of the line, the truth is what navely seems to be: the correspondence with
the object. At this level, traditional methodology is enough. However, at the
microscopic level, there is not correspondence at all and that methodology is
silent: it has nothing to say.
The concept of scientific truth without correspondence related with the general
methodology outlined here should satisfy two conditions previously introduced,
namely: it must be useful in the microscopic and in the macroscopic realms and
it must combine material legality with the fact that the scientific construction
finishes at the edge of human experience. Although the thorough discussion of
this subject would lead far beyond the limits of a single essay, we will briefly
introduce it using a few intuitive examples covering both realms.
In this approach, the concept of truth is established by what it is called
confluence. A confluence is produced when, using different and independent
processes, we reach inexorably the same result. Independent means that one of
the processes could be overturned without the others being necessarily so. Con-
fluence is then more than mere regularity. Regularity is a necessary condition
satisfied in every separate independent process. Each of them is repeatable and
regular, but this is not sufficient to be a confluence. It requires the convergence
of various regularities. For example, the determination of Planck’s constant can
be done based on many different research programs: the black body radiation;
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the photoelectric effect; the Franck-Hertz experiment; the X- Ray production;
etc. When these determinations are done, it is found that, within experimental
errors, the regular results obtained in each independent process converge in the
same value for h. This confluence establishes the consensus inside the physicists’
community, “materializes” the quantity h, and therefore it is said that h is a
truth of physics. We could argue similarly in the case of the Avogadro constant,
determined by more than 30 different and independent methods and many other
cases. Note that, although we have taken two examples from physics that are
constants, belonging to the micro and macroscopic realms respectively, the con-
fluence process does not refer only to physical constants. Is the general manner
of establishing the concept of truth. For example, the movement of the Earth’s
continents relative to each other (Continental drift, Wegener 1912) can be con-
sidered today a scientific truth13 based on the confluence of independent and
regular evidences like: identical fossils of plants and animals that can be found
in Africa, South America, India and Australia; the distribution of the same kind
of glacial sediments in all these regions; the distribution of equal species that,
like the snails, could have not travel through the oceans; the same erosive model
in different continents; the fact that the borders of the continents fit together;
etc.
It is a historical fact in science that whenever the same result has been
reached at least by three or four independent means, it has never been over-
turned. This implies that, as we extend human experience by the process suc-
cinctly described above, the number of confluences never decrease lying down
the foundations of what it is understood as the scientific progress. These con-
fluences besides being permanent are objective: is not in our hands to make
them converge or not. That is, they cannot be manipulated by the desires of
an individual or a community. They are more than intersubjectivity or consen-
sus inside a scientific community. They are the indelible proof that matter can
be organized by our activity according to its own resistance and the simplest
explanation of why scientists are so successful at reaching consensus. Confluen-
tism in physics seems to be able to do, for example, what R. Rorty said that it
could not be done: to have an objective criterion of truth putting aside at the
same time the correspondence theory14. It shows that really there is something
epistemological special about the nature of scientific knowledge. It allows main-
taining contact with the material reality partially undefined as well as holding
that science is a social construction, an idea shared with pragmatists like Rorty
and -with due qualifications- with the strong program of the Edinburg School
(Barnes, 1979; Barnes et al., 1996). What seem to have misled these authors is
that this same procedure is used in all our (social) activities, like jurisprudence,
psychology, history or medicine, to name but a few. However, the big difference,
not considered by these authors in all its relevance, is that, in physics, an appeal
13Although previously anticipated it required the theory of plate tectonics, established only
about 1960.
14“No interesting connection will ever be found between the concept of truth and the concept
of justification. . . truth as the aim of inquiry. . . is either empty or false” (Rorty, 1999), p. 37.
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to the resistance of matter, material legality, is realized. Nevertheless, this is all
we need.
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